

Swarming Terrorist Attack as an Evolving Threat for the European Security

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Abstract- This paper examines contemporary terrorism as a self-improving system that adapts to changes in the security environment. The article focuses on the study of the swarming attack as a terrorist tactic to achieve a strategic effect. The purpose of the publication is to analyse the nature of the complex coordinated terrorist attack and identify the factors that define it as an existing threat to European security. The main research methods include document study, systematic analysis and “case study”. The conclusions related to the change in the tactical methods used by terrorists will contribute to the development of adequate countermeasures by the competent authorities.

Keywords- Al Qaeda, counterterrorism, Islamic State – Khorasan Province, swarming terrorist attack.

I. INTRODUCTION

Contemporary terrorism can be discussed as a complex threat that manifests itself in a variety of forms that depend on the type and structure of the terrorist unit, the measures imposed to counter terrorism by the countries on whose territory the terrorist formations operate, the degree of acceptance of the achievements of scientific and technological progress by terrorists and their application in their own operational techniques and procedures, and last but not least, the changes in the security environment as a result of the political and economic confrontation of global and regional powers.

Terrorist activity can be carried out both by decentralized, independent and self-radicalized actors, as well as by sleeper terrorist cells that operate through centralized control and in coordination with a large “mother” terrorist organization.

Islamist terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS)/Daesh, which have more than a decade of history and combat experience, continue to carry out active propaganda and take responsibility for terrorist

acts committed in different parts of the world. These terrorist organizations develop their activities in a systematic manner with clearly outlined strategic goals to promote the fundamentalist version of Islam and the revival of the caliphate. Tactically, Al-Qaeda and Daesh are evolving, learning from their mistakes, adapting to the counteractions of the security and defence authorities, changing their methods of training, recruiting and deploying fighters in the Dar al-Harb (from the Arabic language “Territory of War” [1], i.e. countries hostile to Islam). Terrorist groups, like business organizations, strive for sustainable development and effective management of human capital [2].

Large terrorist organizations have the human, financial and logistical resources to plan, organize and carry out complex multilateral terrorist attacks or so-called “swarming attacks”. In modern world history, the largest terrorist attack of this type was the attack by Al-Qaeda against the United States on September 11, 2001, and the last swarming attack on the territory of the European Union was the terrorist act of the Islamic State in Paris (France) in November 2015. The multilateral terrorist attacks of the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba in Mumbai (India) in November 2008, of Hamas against Israel in October 2023, of the Islamic State – Khorasan Province in Derbent, Makhachkala and Sergokala (Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation) in June 2024 also achieved a strategic effect.

Despite the exponential increase in the number of individual terrorist attacks in Europe carried out by self-radicalized individuals over the past five years, the threat of a large-scale terrorist attack carried out by well-trained terrorists under the direct operational management of an established jihadist organization has not passed, and the dynamics of the security environment are helping to transform it from a possibility to a probability. This requires an examination of both the nature of the

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swarming attack as a terrorist tactic and the drivers that make it a current threat.

II. MATERIALS AND METHODS

The purpose of this publication is to study the nature of the swarming terrorist attack and to determine the factors that influence its formation as a real threat to the security of the European continent. *The main research tasks* include: defining the concept of a swarming terrorist attack; analysis of the organizational units that carry out complex multilateral terrorist attacks and the tactical methods they use; identifying changes in the security environment that favour the accomplishment of a swarming terrorist attack on the territory of Europe.

The object of the study is complex coordinated attacks as a terrorist tactic to achieve a strategic effect, and *the subject* of the study is the causes and paths for the emergence of the threat of a swarming terrorist attack for European security.

The research is limited to examining cases of swarming type terrorist attacks carried out only by individuals and formations that follow the ideology of global jihad.

The needs of this study were realized through the use of *general scientific methods* such as systematic analysis, synthesis, comparison, generalization, document study, and descriptive “case study”.

Due to the fact that much of the information of research interest is classified, and often part of ongoing investigations, for the purposes of the report, information from open sources was used, which was assessed according to criteria for reliability, accuracy and completeness.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A. *Origin and general characteristics of swarming terrorist attack*

Dispersal or swarming is a military tactic known since ancient times. In the 4th century BC, the Chinese military strategist and general Sun Bin, in his treatise *The Art of War* [3] (not to be confused with Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*), defined the advantages of the tactic of dispersing forces when conducting combat operations against a stronger enemy whose forces are concentrated, noting that strategic advantage can only be achieved through a surprise attack, both in time and place.

Historically, the discussed military tactic was used [4] during the Peloponnesian Wars, the Punic Wars, in the Middle Ages by the Bulgarians, Mongols, and Ottomans, and later even during World War II.

In its contemporary form, swarm tactics are used in maritime piracy raids in the Gulf of Aden [5], in carrying out complex coordinated terrorist attacks, as well as for rapid force projection in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations by security and defence forces.

The term “swarming” is also used to describe the use of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles [6] that work in a coordinated manner within a single control system to perform tasks for both military and civilian purposes.

The theoretical explanation of swarming attacks involves extrapolating animal behavioural patterns for the purposes of military tactics. In their daily activities for subsistence and defence, various animal species organize themselves into collective structural units that allow them to survive more easily in changing natural conditions and in collisions with hostile representatives of the human and animal kingdoms. According to research by the RAND think tank [7] on network warfare and the development of future armed conflicts, the relationship between nature and swarming attacks can be attributed as follows: the organizational behaviour of bees and ants to the tactics of guerrilla groups; the hunting of the wolf pack to the hooliganism of football fans; the behavioural pattern of flies and mosquitoes to the looting of marauders; the lifestyle of viruses and bacteria to the actions of street criminal gangs.

In the context under consideration, the use of swarming attacks by terrorist groups can be attributed to the behaviour of the wolf pack. Despite its limitations, such an analogy helps to deduce and understand the main distinguishing features of the terrorist tactics under study. Similarities are observed in terms of numbers, deliberate aggressiveness, hierarchical dependence, preferred selection of soft targets, opportunism, and reliance on the element of surprise.

In the context of warfare, swarming attacks seek a tactical advantage, as the enemy's security and defence system is overcome asymmetrically, deliberately overloaded through rapid saturation of forces and resources across multiple diverse targets, which leads to a high level of uncertainty, a low degree of predictability, and an increase in response time in the event of a crisis.

A distinctive feature of terrorism is that it uses indiscriminate projection of force, relying on various unconventional tactics and techniques that allow it to achieve high political, economic, social and psychological impact. The synergistic approach multiplies the effect of individual forms and methods [8], and the characteristics of the swarming attack determine it as suitable for implementation by extremist and terrorist groups, which is also facilitated by the development of high technologies.

In essence, a swarming terrorist attack is a complex, multilateral, coordinated terrorist attack in which separate groups of terrorists attack a single target from several directions or different targets, simultaneously or in a short period of time. The location of the attack objects can be in the same administrative-territorial unit, as well as in neighbouring or nearby ones, using a variety of tactical techniques.

In counterterrorism theory, there is no consensus definition of a complex coordinated terrorist attack, but several definitions can nevertheless be distinguished.

According to the United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) operational manual, a complex coordinated terrorist attack is “a violent attack or series of attacks by one or more individuals or groups using one or more types of weapons with the intent to cause harm to a large number of people” [9].

Some weaknesses are noted in the definition presented in this way. The emphasis is placed on the quantitative indicator of perpetrators, human casualties, attacks and types of weapons, without mentioning the heterogeneity of the targets in terms of type, direction of attack, location and time, as well as the connecting element of synchronization and coherence.

According to the United States Department of Homeland Security, complex coordinated terrorist attacks are “acts of terrorism that are carried out by synchronized and independent teams at multiple locations in succession or close succession, initiated with little or no warning, and using one or more weapons systems such as firearms, explosives, arson, and other unconventional attack methods, which are intended to result in a large number of casualties” [10]. It is noteworthy that this definition develops a previous one cited in a scholarly publication, namely that a complex coordinated terrorist attack is “a coordinated attack at one or more locations in close succession, initiated with little or no warning, using one or more of the following: firearms, explosives, and arson” [11].

In the two definitions above, the authors focus on the temporal factor, the minimal possibility of advance notice of the attack, the specific means of attack, the multiplicity of targets, the coherence of the actions of the individual attacking groups and the loss of human lives. In general, the second definition could be expanded, especially since the tactical methods are limited, which places a restriction on the weapons used and does not reflect the objective reality in its entirety. The characterization proposed by Homeland Security does not allow some of the coordinated attacking terrorist structures to be composed of only one person, but emphasizes “synchronized and independent teams”, without making it clear whether these groups of terrorists are independent in terms of a single operational command or independently carry out the attack against each specific target.

The following characteristics relevant to the swarming terrorist attack can be identified:

- Hybridity – expressed in the combined use of various tactical techniques such as automatic firearms, simple and complex improvised explosive devices (including those mounted on unmanned aerial vehicles), edged weapons, vehicle attacks, etc.
 - Suddenness – expressed in the rapid deployment of forces without prior indication of their intentions to attack
 - Asymmetry – expressed in attacking “soft” enemy targets

- Autonomy – projected in the independent logistical support of the fighters and the selection of the tactical method
- High mobility – expressed in the ability to attack targets situated in a location other than the permanent residence of the terrorists and the leadership of the terrorist organization, as well as in the ability for a quick planned withdrawal after the attack
- Uncertainty – expressed in terms of manifestation in time and space, which leads to low predictability
- Flexibility – expressed in the ability of terrorists to adapt to the security measures of the competent authorities and change the choice of their targets
- High intensity – projected to saturate forces and resources against enemy targets in a short time
- Complexity – expressed in the high level of planning and organization, maintaining a high level of combat readiness by terrorists, as well as the ability to attack targets in different domains such as land, air, water and cyberspace
- Coordination – projected in the coordinated attack against multiple targets by different terrorist groups or attacking one key target by many sides
- Strategic effect – as a result of the terrorist attack, a long-term qualitative change is achieved in the political, economic and social system of the enemy

Based on the analysis, the following definition of a swarming terrorist attack can be proposed:

A swarming terrorist attack is a pre-planned, coordinated multi-vector terrorist attack, in which several separate terrorist units attack with different tactical methods simultaneously or in a short temporal interval multiple heterogeneous targets or one target from several sides, aiming for the maximum number of human casualties and large material damage.

The structure of the proposed definition includes:

- *The essential features of the concept* – a pre-planned coordinated multi-vector terrorist attack
- *The subjects of the terrorist attack* – separate terrorist units (a unit is understood as a small organizational unit)
- *The objects of the terrorist attack* – multiple heterogeneous targets or one target from several countries
- *The specific manner of carrying out the attack* – using different tactical techniques
- *Time frame* – simultaneously or in a short temporal interval

- *The desired effect of the attack* – maximum number of human casualties and large material damage

B. Case study

There are several emblematic "swarming" terrorist attacks carried out due to Islamist motives on the territory of the European continent in the last ten years - the terrorist attacks in Paris (France) in November 2015, the bombings in Brussels (Belgium) in March 2016, the attack in London (Great Britain) in June 2017 and the terrorist act in Moscow (Russia) in March 2024.

The cases are selected based on the criteria - relevance, multilateralism and complexity of the attack, diversity of targets and tactical approaches, and a large number of dead and wounded.

Although the above-mentioned events have been studied many times, for the purposes of this research, they should be analysed comprehensively in their entirety and interconnectedness. Indicators of scientific interest include: profile of the perpetrators; nature of the targets; affiliation with a large terrorist organization; tactical methods used; number of dead and injured.

TABLE 1 MAIN ATTRIBUTES OF THE SWARMING TERRORIST ATTACKS IN EUROPE

Location and date	Attackers	Targets	Tactical methods	Deaths	Injured
Paris, 2015	9	6	2	130	350
Brussels, 2016	5	2	1	32	340
London, 2017	3	1	2	8	48
Moscow, 2024	4	1	3	145	500

The terrorist attack in Paris, carried out on the evening of November 13, 2015, is the largest terrorist act in the recent history of France and an event that changed the security environment throughout Europe.

The attack was carried out by ten terrorists (9 direct perpetrators, including the terrorist group's leader, as well as one logistician who was supposed to blow himself up at the first target, but gave up), divided into three teams, who attacked 6 targets at three different locations. The total number of deaths from all targets of the terrorist attack is 130, and the number of injured is 350, with the highest number of victims (90) at the last location (in shooting at the concert hall) [12].

The first group of terrorists blew themselves up at two of the entrances to the French national stadium in the suburb of Saint-Denis and next to a restaurant in the area of the sports facility, using vests with improvised explosive devices (so-called "martyr belts"). These terrorists failed to complete their mission due to their

failure to enter the audience, in which only one person died besides themselves and about fifty were injured.

The second squad used indiscriminate street shooting against visitors to various cafes, bars and restaurants in two administrative districts close to each other (the 10th and 11th), with one of the attackers blowing himself up.

The third team attacked the Bataclan concert hall, with the terrorists firing randomly with automatic weapons, and in the subsequent contact with a police patrol that responded to the scene, one of the attackers blew himself up. The remaining two jihadists take hostages, after which the Special Forces storm the building. The terrorists are eliminated, with one of them, although wounded managing to activate the explosive device he was carrying.

The Brussels bombings were carried out by five terrorists, divided into two teams, consisting of three and two fighters respectively, who attacked two targets – the capital's airport and a train leaving a metro station near the Council of the European Union and the European Commission headquarters. 32 people were killed and another 340 were injured [13].

The first team of three suicide bombers attacked Brussels Airport, with two terrorists detonating two improvised explosive devices in suitcases in the departure area within a few seconds. The third terrorist hesitated and escaped without carrying out his mission.

The second team of two terrorists was scheduled to detonate improvised explosive devices in backpacks they were carrying in the capital's metro trains. Only one jihadist succeeded, while the other gave up and returned to his safe house.

Based on the analysis of publicly available information [14], the following profile of the fifteen terrorists who carried out the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels can be outlined: all between the ages of 20 and 31; second-generation immigrants with a predominant Moroccan origin and Belgian residence; combat experience gained as Daesh fighters in Syria; have a criminal past related to theft, fraud, forgery, possession and trafficking of narcotics, or have already come under the attention of the security services due to involvement in terrorist activity.

It is striking that a large part of the perpetrators have known each other well since childhood (having grown up in the Muslim neighbourhoods of Brussels) and have participated in different types of crimes together. Sharing common fates and long-standing friendships help build trust, which is realized in group radicalization and in successful teamwork in the preparation and execution of terrorist acts.

Some of the jihadists also have family ties - two of the perpetrators of the attacks in Paris are brothers, as are two of the suicide bombers in Brussels. This once again proves the role of the family environment in the radicalization process and emphasizes that when individual members of a family unit follow a common

radical ideology, this can develop into a form of family terrorism [15].

Regarding the terrorist cell’s management system and the planning, preparation, organization, and execution of the discussed terrorist acts in Paris and Brussels, a three-tier chain of command can be outlined: a field officer who is directly responsible for carrying out terrorist attacks on a territorial basis and directs them on the ground; a tactical-level commander who prepares, organizes, coordinates, and directs the attacks from a remote command and control center in Belgium; and a unified operational command of the Islamic State that plans all terrorist operations in Western Europe.

The terrorist cell also shows signs of network decentralization and autonomy in making tactical decisions, as well as flexibility and adaptability in the event of loss of strength and the emergence of extraordinary circumstances. When the terrorist, who is a tactical-level commander, is eliminated in a clash with the Belgian security authorities [16], the group tasked with carrying out the bombings against the airport and the metro in Brussels continues to act according to plan and a week later carries out the two coordinated attacks. It can be concluded that in terms of decision-making autonomy, the terrorist operation resembles a special military operation in urban conditions, when in conditions of information deficit and uncertainty, the initiative of field commanders [17] is essential for the successful implementation of the assigned tasks. At the same time, the management of the terrorist cell also uses “integrative processes to synchronize various specific functions” [18].

In terms of coordination and timing of the terrorist acts in Paris and Brussels, the Daesh cell showed exceptional precision in its planning. The attacks on the three different locations in Paris began at 21:20, 21:25 and 21:40 [19], respectively, and the bombings of the airport and the metro in Brussels at 07:58 and 09:11 [20]. The purpose was to create a shock effect on the security systems of the attacked countries, which led to a lack of reaction time and a concentration of forces and resources by law enforcement agencies at all the attacked locations, overloading emergency telephone lines, hospitals and the fire department, and blocking public transport. In France, the terrorist operation was controlled in real time by the field commander, as well as by the remote command and control center in Brussels, which was in constant communication with the terrorist teams.

On the evening of 3 June 2017 [21], three individuals of Moroccan and Pakistani origin carried out a terrorist attack in London, driving a van into pedestrians on the pavement of London Bridge. After their vehicle crashed, the terrorists got out and began stabbing indiscriminately at people walking along the streets to nearby bars. The attack left 8 dead and 48 injured [22], and the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack. Interestingly, the jihadists used ceramic kitchen knives, which are easily accessible and can pass through metal detectors without hindrance. The attackers were aged between 22

and 30, were self-radicalised and showed visible signs of praising radical Islam and terrorism, and two of them had come under the attention of the security services, with one even being a member of the UK-designated terrorist group Al-Muhajiroun [23]. No direct operational leadership of the attack by the Islamic State has been established.

On the evening of 22 March 2024 [24], four individuals of Tajik origin carried out a coordinated terrorist attack on the Crocus City Hall concert hall in Moscow, firing indiscriminately with automatic weapons, stabbing the wounded, and starting a fire with improvised incendiary devices, killing 145 people and injuring over 500. The Islamic State Khorasan Province claimed responsibility for the attack, with the terrorist organization publishing a photo of its fighters [25] making the “jihad” sign and posing against a Daesh flag. The attack was carried out with exceptional audacity, being well-planned and prepared, despite the high security measures in Russia.

TABLE 2 ASSESSMENT OF THE SWARMING TERRORIST ATTACKS IN EUROPE

Location and date	Intensity	Complexity	Effect
Paris, 2015	High	High	High
Brussels, 2016	Medium	High	High
London, 2017	High	Low	Medium
Moscow, 2024	High	Medium	High

The four terrorist attacks studied (Paris, Brussels, London and Moscow) have all the characteristics of a swarming terrorist attack, which allows them to be compared in terms of intensity, complexity and achieved effect, and to highlight some differences.

The attack in France is of high intensity, high complexity and high effect. This is determined by the scale of the terrorist attack (6 targets in three different locations), the high level of organization, the diverse tactical methods and the short temporal interval for which the force was projected, as well as the large number of victims and injured.

The terrorist act in Belgium is of medium intensity, high complexity and high effect. Here the assessment of medium intensity is dictated by the larger interval during which the attacks at the airport and in the metro begin – about one hour, as well as the smaller number of attackers involved. The complexity comes from the coordination of an attack against two objects of critical infrastructure, which are strictly guarded. The effect remains high, despite the lower number of victims compared to Paris, as the attacks were carried out in a city where a number of European and international

institutions located (headquarters of the EU, NATO and the UN).

The attack in the UK is of high intensity, low complexity and medium effect. The high intensity is imposed by the short time in which the terrorist act was carried out (about 10 minutes), including contact with law enforcement agencies. The complexity is low, as easily accessible tactical means are used - vehicles and kitchen knives, and there is also no need to overcome complex protection systems. The effect is medium due to the small number of victims and injured, compared to the other cases considered, but still the publicity of the terrorist act and the attack on an emblematic architectural landmark in London achieve a sufficient effect.

The terrorist attack in Russia is of high intensity, medium complexity and high effect. High intensity is defined by the use of three tactical approaches in the attack on a large-scale facility, requiring only about 10 minutes for the execution of the mission and then quickly withdraw. Although it requires detailed planning, the terrorist act can be classified as medium complexity, since only one facility with a low level of security is attacked. High impact refers to the huge number of dead and injured, as well as to the large material damage.

C. Current drivers of the threat

The current drivers of the threat of new swarming terrorist attacks on the territory of Europe are developing in “a complex context of politics, security, international relations, law and sovereignty” [26], and they can be classified into several main groups related to the development of processes in the external and internal security environment.

The drivers that relate to the external security environment include:

- *The presence of key vital points that are a haven for global jihadism.* These are countries or geographical areas in which, for political reasons, terrorists can develop their recruitment, training and financing activities in conditions of relative freedom and even cooperation with local authorities. Currently, such areas are located in Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Congo, etc.
- *Regional conflicts that have a global projection in terms of the radicalization process.* The unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict contributes to the encapsulation of religious and ethnic foundations in Europe and the accumulation of sentiments for the violent resolution of ideological disputes.
- *Activity of large and established terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.* These terrorist organizations continue to carry out active propaganda in their media outlets such as Amaq, Al-Azaim, Thabat, Al-Naba, distribute practical manuals for violent jihad, have significant financial resources, and take responsibility for terrorist attacks.

- *Increase in illegal migration.* Conflict zones create conditions for the movement of large masses of people and the infiltration of extremists and terrorists into illegal migrant flows, including those with combat experience and plans for future terrorist attacks on the territory of Europe.
- *Illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons.* The war in Ukraine contributes to the presence of a large number of small arms and light weapons in circulation, which is exploited by organized crime, which illegally imports them into Europe and can sell them to various radicalized individuals ready to commit a terrorist act.
- *Globalization of high technology and information connectivity.* The widespread use of cryptocurrency trading helps diversify the sources and methods of financing terrorism, and the development of mobile applications for anonymous and encrypted communication facilitates the communication security of terrorists and terrorist organizations.

Drivers related to the internal security environment include:

- *Lowering the age limit for radicalization in Europe.* The steady trend of increasing numbers of minors and juveniles arrested in Europe for involvement in terrorist activities creates a prerequisite for their easier recruitment by large terrorist organizations and their involvement in the preparation and execution of a complex coordinated terrorist attack.
- *Loss of intelligence positions.* It is related to the redirection and commitment of intelligence resources to other areas, such as the war in Ukraine, as well as to the decisions to withdraw forces and assets from various hot spots in Africa (France from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger) and Afghanistan (termination of missions to support international peace and security).
- *Defects in legislation and the criminal process.* Weaknesses in the national legislation of some countries hinder the effective criminal prosecution of persons accused of terrorist activities.
- *Unidentified returned foreign fighters.* A large part of European citizens who fought on the side of various extremist and terrorist groups in Africa and the Middle East, including in the ranks of the Islamic State, remain off the radar, with some of them not falling into the established risk profiles, and others having entered European territory among the flows of illegal migrants, using false identity documents.

- *Increasing vulnerability to radicalization of marginalized social groups.* The formation of peculiar ghettos in large European cities leads to encapsulation, rejection of secular education, non-recognition of the authority of state institutions and easy acceptance of radical models of behaviour and communication with those who are different.
- *Increasing street crime.* Practical cases show that a large proportion of perpetrators of terrorist acts in Europe have criminal records for involvement in petty crimes, which helps to blur the line between good and evil, legal and illegal, and makes it easier to involve them in terrorist activity.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

It can be concluded that the more time passes since the last complex and coordinated terrorist act on the territory of Europe, the more the probability of a new one increases. Planning, preparing and organizing a large swarming attack require intelligence, logistical and financial support in the conditions of conspiratoriality and network decentralization. The improvement of the system for countering terrorism in European countries leads to a search for new forms and methods for organizing large terrorist attacks by terrorist groups.

It can be predicted that, trying to overcome state security systems, terrorist organizations will evolve mainly in terms of the profile of the fighters who are assigned to participate in complex coordinated attacks, their level of training, as well as the tactical methods used.

It is possible that the new profile of the terrorist will be characterized by a pure criminal past, hidden signs of radicalization, good social status and integration into European societies, as well as the use of more and more women and children in attacks. The possible revival of dormant terrorist cells will increase the level of unpredictability and enhance the effect of surprise.

At the tactical level, it is possible to use drones with installed improvised explosive or incendiary devices, as the costs of making them are not high, and some of the terrorists already have similar combat experience in Syria. The other threat is related to the use of poisons, chemical and biological weapons, as access to precursors is facilitated by weak border control in Afghanistan and Syria, and scientists and experts can be attracted, both on a voluntary basis and through threats.

Effective counteraction to the organization and conduct of swarming terrorist attacks requires the acquisition of information in advance by creating intelligence sources among the commanders of terrorist organizations, individuals and entities that support terrorism, and among opposition resistance movements, as well as the use of know-how operational combinations.

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